This remains one of my go-to texts for my World Wars class and is well-received by my students, whose ideas about the Second World War and its outcome are transformed by Overy’s brilliant book. It is a masterpiece of analytical history presenting a very different take on the war—one of industry, economics, technology, and production.

An influential political scientist and military analyst, Luttwak provides an insightful overview of military strategy. He provides clear explanations of important theorists and concepts but, most importantly, emphasizes the paradoxical nature of strategic planning in discussions that resemble the duel of wits in the book and movie The Princess Bride (1973 and 1987).

How does one outthink and outwit an enemy while avoiding falling into the traps an enemy has laid for you? How does one avoid executing obvious and easy strategies while still playing to one’s strengths and avoiding needless complexity? How does one encourage an enemy to make mistakes and lure them into traps? 

This is one of the only discussions of the evolution of Confederate strategy in the east, and for that reason alone it should be read.

Unfortunately, it focuses too much on Lee and does not broaden the perspective beyond Virginia and Maryland. Harsh also makes the key mistake of denying the importance of accomplishing political goals to General Lee in Maryland. In this sense, his perspective is too narrow.

In fact, Harsh misses entirely the direct relationship between the Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns, both of which Davis decided to launch after a conference at the Executive Mansion on July 13, 1862.

Despite these failings, Harsh provides a lot of ground-level details on the Confederate effort in Maryland that are useful to enthusiasts and specialists.

This too often overlooked classic—written by my PhD advisor—not only explains why Clausewitz wrote his masterpiece but what he was trying to say. In doing so, Sumida breaks conventional understandings of both the great German military philosopher and the very subject of military history. Clausewitz and Sumida combine to eschew history limited to explaining outcomes by linearly tracing them back to their origins and instead advocate for narratives that reveal what the participants saw as their options in the moment and then contextualizes their choices and actions. It is this path that leads to knowledge gained through synthetic experience. Decoding Clausewitz is the single most influential work in my approach to military history.

More than one in four Germans served during the Second World War, but only one in ten of these volunteered.

In the eight decades since that conflict, the history of this staggering mobilization has been rewritten several times but remains controversial, particularly as more recent research is revealing the scale and complexity of the German military’s involvement in the genocidal policies of the Nazi regime.

Ben Shepherd offers a balanced and finely nuanced account of the German armed forces, their organization, culture, and conduct of total war, noting the importance of context, whilst indicating that the postwar distinction between ‘good German soldiers’ and ‘bad Nazis’ is a myth. 

Alfred Thayer Mahan was the first modern scholar to seriously explore naval strategy. He discussed how strategy at sea differed from strategy on land, what naval power could and could not do, and the advantages of being a sea power like Great Britain as opposed to a land power like Russia or Germany.

Unfortunately, Mahan’s works, particularly his classic The Influence of Sea Power upon History (1890), are ponderous and often difficult to read. Jon Sumida’s short book summarizes and explains Mahan’s key ideas, often better than Mahan himself, and underlines their enduring importance. 

My last recommendation is one I read recently, published by Chris Woolston. I worked with Chris Woolston for many years in two different companies, and he did a great job; then he formed his own company called “Forward Thinking.”

He is a great strategist. His book encapsulates the essence of his approach to strategy in life and at work. The Bible, says, “Where there is no vision, the people perish,” but I personally add that you need a good strategic plan to achieve your vision.

People often struggle with the concept of strategy–it can sound worthy and intellectual–but in essence, it is a simple concept.  You need to be clear about what you want to achieve and have a clear plan to achieve it, a plan that draws on your unique strengths to achieve what is important to you and your company, often in a testing environment with all sorts… show more.

This book is a beautiful, non-mathematical introduction to Game Theory for everyone, even high school students interested in strategy, its basic modeling, and how to solve games.

It has applications to everyday life, including examples from real business and political science, making it accessible to all sorts of readers. Its verbal description of some solution concepts and mathematical results is, however, too lengthy at times, especially for non-English speakers and students with a good math background, potentially leading to unnecessary confusion.

For readers who are interested in learning how to think about international relations, strategy, security, and history.

The collection of essays discusses US foreign policy, nuclear politics, and the Cold War. My favorite is Trachtenberg’s critical reassessment of the origins of the First World War, a destructive conflict no one wanted to happen but still walked into.

I always assign this book to my students.

Of the many books explaining the success of the Roman Empire, this is by far the best in that it shows how Rome continually adapted its strategy in building and sustaining its empire. Rome's strategy was not ceaseless fighting but comprehensive strategies that unified force, diplomacy, and an immense infrastructure. Initially relying on client states to buffer attacks, Rome moved to permanent frontier defense. Finally, as barbarians began to penetrate the empire, Rome fielded large armies in a strategy of defense-in-depth. This book's lesson for business strategy is that companies need to constantly adapt their strategies as their circumstances change. The book also has powerful implications for modern geopolitical strategy—be flexible in both means and ends.