Books like Confederate Tide Rising — picked by fans

I think this is a particularly strong book because it provides details about the Confederate decision-making process that I have not read elsewhere.

The interpretation of the historical sources is also outstanding. Glatthaar clarifies the thinking of Confederate leaders about important issues, such as the raising of armies and their provisioning.

The book helped shape my understanding of the challenges Davis and Lee faced and the solutions they undertook to solve them.

Kegel ties together threads in the early history of the war that have an impact on its later course.

These include the adoption of an offensive strategy that would push the war out of Virginia and into Pennsylvania. Kegel elevates the importance of Stonewall Jackson as a strategic thinker in particular and elucidates his influence on Robert E. Lee.

In my own studies, I have found that Jackson did indeed make suggestions Lee later followed, particularly when it came to offensive operations, but Kegel leaves out a key figure in his work - Jefferson Davis.

Like Jackson, Davis shared a preference for offensive action, but Davis did not adopt this opinion from Jackson. Similarly, Davis and Lee had discussed many times taking the fight to the enemy before Jackson became involved at a strategic level.

Lee then carried out Davis’s orders in September 1862 when he led his army across… show more.

This is another important book on the development of Confederate strategy.

Like Harsh, I think Woodworth places too much emphasis on Lee, but he at least includes Davis as a protagonist. To that end, Woodworth’s claim that Davis was convinced the South should fight a defensive war is flat out wrong. He is keen enough to point out how P.G.T. Beauregard, Gustavus Smith, Stonewall Jackson, and even Joe Johnston all clamored for an offensive that would dampen Northern will to win the war.

He simply misses the fact, however, that Davis agreed with them. Davis, however, was the only man of the group who had a national perspective and knew what could be accomplished given the men and materiel limitations of his armies.  

This is the most detailed history of the Battle of Antietam available and is filled with insight. 

The stories Hartwig unearthed are compelling and fascinating. Of all the books on Antietam, this one makes you feel closest to the action. It is a moving, often chilling, read.

Hartwig also offers new thoughts on the effectiveness of George McClellan as a general and even some criticism that will be new to many readers.

The book stumbles when it comes to developing a wider perspective, including the lack of an explanation of why Robert E. Lee decided to fight at Antietam. This weakens the book’s impact a bit as the reader continues to come away bewildered about why the general would have taken such a dangerous risk with his army.

Kaplan does a marvelous job describing, as the subtitle indicates, “the secret history of nuclear war.” It is in a sense a sequel to Kaplan’s earlier The Wizards of Armageddon, which examined theorists of nuclear annihilation. In The Bomb, Kaplan takes us on a deep dive into the bowels of actual doomsday planning; an unforgettable and darkly educational trip!

The insurgents of the title are a group of military officers, many of whom had taught at West Point’s Department of Social Sciences, who attempted to help the Army and the nation come to terms with the war in Iraq. Ironically, most had been opposed to the invasion of Iraq in 2003; nonetheless, they worked with great urgency to understand the conflict and produce better policies to minimize the suffering and harm to U.S. interests it caused. The team, led by Army General David Petraeus and Marine General James Mattis, created the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual that Petraeus implemented when he took command of the Iraq war effort in 2007, changing the course of the war and America’s understanding of the future of conflict.

A wonderful book! James Church is former intelligence officer, and in Bamboo and Blood, he weaves a tale of murder and missile deals, set in the context of North Korea's famine. 

With its evocation of cold, snow, and death, Inspector O encounters a giggling Israeli agent; a solitary, lonely North Korean general; a former colleague from a failed mission; a bevy of North Korean diplomats; and a Swiss counterintelligence officer. The tale ends with Inspector O's caveat to the Israeli agent: "Belief is easy. It's doubting that causes difficulties." 

Inspector O survives the famine, and another winter, as does North Korea. This novel by Church, like his debut spy thriller/mystery, A Corpse in the Koryo: An Inspector O Novel, is one to be savored.

Most Confederate soldiers were not slaveholders, but as historian Colin Woodward argues, all of them were products of a slaveholding culture and, as a result, fought to maintain the rigid racial hierarchy that had come to define their respective communities. Appreciating the central place that the defense of slavery occupied for most Confederates helps us to better understand why the war lasted as long as it did. Some of the most interesting chapters in this book explore the roles played by thousands of body servants that accompanied officers from the slaveholding class. Enslaved men performed a wide range of jobs, including cooking meals, washing clothes, and digging ditches. Their presence served as a constant reminder of the army’s reliance on enslaved labor and its broader significance as the Confederacy’s “cornerstone.”

I have been teaching about the wars in Afghanistan since 2004 and this book is the best at showcasing how individual lives are indelibly affected by armed conflict. Gopal is fabulous in humanizing his characters—a Taliban commander, a member of the US-backed Afghan government, or a village housewife. And he demonstrates how none of these people fit neatly into the preconceived categories applied to them by Americans.

Perhaps better than any other book on Afghanistan after 9/11, Gopal also reveals the limits of US military power overseas. In many ways, the presence of American soldiers exacerbated local conflict rather than ameliorating it. A powerful book arguing against those who extol the value of “generational wars” to achieve US foreign policy objectives.

Parris’ book provides a “peek behind the curtains” to look at the decision-making process, particularly in Washington.

He uses eye-witness reports to highlight the differences between the various actors, and underlines disagreements within governments. Truman, for example, was not only often at odds with his generals and diplomats, he was also considered a “lame duck” president, destined for electoral defeat during the critical early months of the blockade and airlift.

Understanding his relationships with his cabinet officials is thus extremely illuminating and well handled by Parrish. The weakness of the book is that its focus on American politics and issues results in a comparative neglect of British, German, and Soviet perspectives.