100 Books Like Has Man a Future?

Toby Ord’s sobering and deeply researched examination of existential threats explores pivotal challenges like climate change, nuclear war, and AI. I’m fascinated by his thoughtful analysis, which positions humanity at a crossroads where our choices today could determine whether we thrive or collapse.

This book aligns closely with many of my own concerns, particularly in its discussion of AI as a potential existential risk. Ord’s emphasis on responsible stewardship of powerful technologies echoes my concerns about autonomous weapons and the unpredictability of AI decision-making. His call for ethical governance and adaptation in global security is crucial as we determine AI’s role in shaping humanity’s future.

Despite having been published 70 years ago, this eloquent book still has enduring appeal as it provides an intellectually stimulating way of approaching big ideas.

It teaches us how to think both deeply and pragmatically about the monumental challenges facing humanity. In his unique way, Berlin, a Fellow of All Souls College in Oxford and one of the most important thinkers of the twentieth century, gives us prescient philosophical insights into human behaviour.

I loved this book because it provides a unique view of the ramifications of AI, including its impact on politics, international relations, and the military. While not a book one would use to learn the basics of the technology of artificial intelligence, it nevertheless provides a useful view of its important non-technical ramifications.

Renowned astrophysicist Martin Rees examines humanity’s existential risks and opportunities with a clarity that’s both scientific and urgent. I love the extent to which Rees tackles climate change, biotechnology, and, crucially, artificial intelligence, offering a balanced perspective on the promises and perils of technological progress.

His insights on AI’s role in warfare align closely with my own concerns, particularly the unpredictable nature of autonomous systems. Rees’ call for global collaboration and ethical foresight is a rallying cry that echoes throughout my work as well.

I was researching a novel and wanted to know more about the Cuban Missile Crisis. This non-fiction book reads like an action thriller, going hour by hour, sometimes minute by minute.

I finished this one in a single weekend and felt almost physically sick at the thought of how close the world had come to Armageddon in those few tense days and how lucky we were the leaders of the time were so determined to avoid it.

Would our leaders today be as level-headed? You judge!

I find that this book is as gripping and suspenseful as any Cold War novel. Yes, I knew the ending: the United States and the Soviets avoided nuclear war. But it is fascinating to read about the internal discussions and secret negotiations that took place throughout the crisis.

I tend to be skeptical of the mythology surrounding John F. Kennedy, but this book did give me a new appreciation for his leadership during this critical moment of the Cold War. 

The books discussed above concentrate on the missile crisis in the US, but there was also a crisis in Moscow and Havana. Americans called this event “the Cuban missile crisis,” the Soviets called it “the Caribbean Crisis,” and the Cubans “the October crisis”—because conflict with the US had become a recurring fact of life in Cuba. The Kennedy administration had also been sponsoring sabotage and political assassination in Cuba kept secret from the American people but well known to the Russians and the Cubans. The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis opens a window into Castro’s fury at not being informed or consulted about the secret October 27 Kennedy-Khrushchev deal to remove the missiles from both Cuba and Turkey; only the masterful November diplomacy by Khrushchev’s personal envoy in Cuba, Anastas Mikoyan, kept the deal on track. 

Voorhees' assessment of John F. Kennedy's leadership during the Cuban missile crisis is strikingly different from most books on the subject. He examines JFK's decision-making through the lens of the president's domestic political concerns and use of back-channel diplomacy with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev rather than through the conventional workings of his foreign and national security policy establishments. He also challenges the prevailing view that Kennedy's ultimate strategy for resolving the crisis was primarily shaped by the “ExComm” or by the top officials at the Pentagon, State Department, and CIA. Voorhees insists, supported by an impressive array of evidence, that the Cuban missile crisis did not bring the world to the brink of nuclear Armageddon and his book promises to become an integral part of the historical conversation.

I first met Colonel Whitten in October 2012 when he attended the Cuban Missile Crisis 50th Anniversary conference that I organized for The Cold War Museum and George Mason University. His book is a nonfiction narrative about the Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron 2 (VMCJ-2) that flew low-level photographic reconnaissance flights over Cuba before, during, and after the Crisis in their F8U-1P (RF-8A) Crusaders. As a result of these missions, the VMCJ-2 squadron was awarded a Navy Unit Commendation for the period September 1, 1960 – December 1, 1962. According to USMC Brigadier General William A. Bloomer (ret) who wrote the forward, this book not only gives an account of the Marine Corps role in the Crisis but also, “recounts Castro’s rise to power, the Bay of Pigs fiasco, and his build up in military capabilities courtesy of the Soviet Union.”

At the height of the Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy met with the Pentagon’s head of civil defense, Steuart Pittman, to assess plans for protecting the American civilian population in the event of nuclear war. JFK mistakenly claimed that rural America could be better protected from radiation than urban America; Pittman, however, bluntly told the president that he was wrong: insisting that, “the only protection today is in the cities and there is little or no protection in the rural areas.” Kennedy became quite irritated, but unfortunately, his harsh reply was largely lost because the sound quality of the tape recording suddenly went from poor to inaudible. The fact that the President himself was so misinformed about civil defense sums up the research and conclusions of Alice George’s sobering book: planning for civil defense had been chaotic and inadequate and if nuclear war had come the results would have been… show more.