Books like The War for Korea, 1950-1951 — picked by fans

Hampton Sides for me is the gold standard for narrative history, whether writing about the Old West or World War II, and this book about Chosin Reservoir ranks among his finest.

What I always appreciate about his books is his ability to find humanity and wit in many dark episodes of American history. 

This magisterial work of history by Halberstam – sadly, his final before his death – captures for me the wild swings of fortune that, for me, make the first year of the Korean War unmatched in historical drama.

Halberstam is unsparing in his judgment of the mistakes made by the American high command. I’ve long held Halberstam to be one of our finest journalists/historians, and this book matched my expectations.

This book may be the best-written narrative account of Chosin, but I must include a caveat. Russ justly lionizes the performance of the U.S. Marines and their heroic breakout from Chosin, but he unfairly denigrates the U.S. Army soldiers who fought in the same campaign.

Russ was a Marine who served in Korea, so I read his book with a grain of salt. But this absorbing, funny, and deeply human account of one of the most brutal battles the U.S. ever fought is nonetheless a classic of narrative history.

With a journalist’s eye for the telling detail and a historian’s grand perspective, Clay Blair wrote what I consider the finest account of the first year of the Korean War.

I’ve gone through Blair’s papers at the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, and his research was encyclopedic, with countless interviews and deep dives into archives.

While I don’t agree with all of Blair’s conclusions, his experience as a war correspondent and historian combine to make this essential reading for all interested in the war.

If Jonathan Schell’s Fate of the Earth examined the scientific, ecological, and social impacts of nuclear war, Robert Scheer’s With Enough Shovels is a direct inquiry into the Reagan Administration about their initial thoughts on the subject. Those thoughts, frankly, are frightening. As the title implicates, then-Deputy Under Secretary of Defense T.J. Jones literally suggested that surviving thermonuclear war was easy: “Dig a hole, cover it with a couple of doors and then throw three feet of dirt on top…it’s the dirt that does it…if there are enough shovels to go around, everybody’s going to make it.” Comments by Reagan, Vice President Bush, Defense Secretary Weinberger, and an increasing contingent of “Neo-Conservatives” writing in journals such as Commentary echoed these sentiments. In part, Scheer’s book began a long process of the Reagan Administration scaling back their bravado and recognizing the real dangers of the atomic age. 

I have been teaching about the wars in Afghanistan since 2004 and this book is the best at showcasing how individual lives are indelibly affected by armed conflict. Gopal is fabulous in humanizing his characters—a Taliban commander, a member of the US-backed Afghan government, or a village housewife. And he demonstrates how none of these people fit neatly into the preconceived categories applied to them by Americans.

Perhaps better than any other book on Afghanistan after 9/11, Gopal also reveals the limits of US military power overseas. In many ways, the presence of American soldiers exacerbated local conflict rather than ameliorating it. A powerful book arguing against those who extol the value of “generational wars” to achieve US foreign policy objectives.

The insurgents of the title are a group of military officers, many of whom had taught at West Point’s Department of Social Sciences, who attempted to help the Army and the nation come to terms with the war in Iraq. Ironically, most had been opposed to the invasion of Iraq in 2003; nonetheless, they worked with great urgency to understand the conflict and produce better policies to minimize the suffering and harm to U.S. interests it caused. The team, led by Army General David Petraeus and Marine General James Mattis, created the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual that Petraeus implemented when he took command of the Iraq war effort in 2007, changing the course of the war and America’s understanding of the future of conflict.

This is one of the only discussions of the evolution of Confederate strategy in the east, and for that reason alone it should be read.

Unfortunately, it focuses too much on Lee and does not broaden the perspective beyond Virginia and Maryland. Harsh also makes the key mistake of denying the importance of accomplishing political goals to General Lee in Maryland. In this sense, his perspective is too narrow.

In fact, Harsh misses entirely the direct relationship between the Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns, both of which Davis decided to launch after a conference at the Executive Mansion on July 13, 1862.

Despite these failings, Harsh provides a lot of ground-level details on the Confederate effort in Maryland that are useful to enthusiasts and specialists.

In this book, John Tirman offers an unapologetic view of the true human cost of America’s wars of choice throughout the world, particularly those in the twenty-first century in the greater Middle East.

Reading Tirman, I came to understand the true face of American war as seen through the eyes of the victims of American war policy, namely civilians who never held a weapon nor lifted a finger in anger against the United States. Tirman informs that war kills, and to a staggering extent, it kills innocent civilians.

As a citizen of the American Empire in the twenty-first century, it was critical for me to know what the United States does in my name and who around the world is adversely affected by the nation's violent policies. I found Tirman to be an invaluable voice in my pursuit of that vital information. 

This book genuinely changes our understanding of British defence policy before the First World War. It is often assumed that the German challenge to British naval supremacy before 1914 was a mirage and that fears that Germany might launch an invasion of the British Isles were simple scaremongering. The reality was different. The Royal Navy may have been bigger and stronger than its German counterpart, but its task was harder and its leaders were not confident that they could prevent German soldiers from landing on British soil. Based on first-rate research, this book explains why.