100 Books Like The Lost Peace

This well-researched book, using prime sources, is an objective and important history. It explains why Washington failed to forge a new European security order in working with Moscow at the end of the “first” Cold War.

Sarotte examines the question as to why Mikhail Gorbachev appeared to be promised by then-US Secretary of State James Baker (and other Western officials) that NATO membership would not expand beyond East Germany at the time of German unification. Just as importantly, Sarotte’s book examines why the US-proposed “Partnership for Peace”―which could have helped to establish a new system of security for eastern European states with Russian cooperation, in my view―was not pursued.

Instead, as I had argued in Dangerous Crossroads, Clinton opted to pursue the NATO “Self-Limitation”  approach (no troops, no nuclear weapons), knowing full well that both Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin had warned that NATO’s expansion without strong Russian input… show more.

This is a unique book that, based on Greek tragedy, develops a deeper, philosophical understanding of the Ukraine-Russia conflict, with an eye toward conflict resolution.

In closely examining that conflict, with Russian language sources, and from a historical and rare socio-cultural-linguistic perspective, Petro’s book shows how an essentially local/regional dispute over the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine has helped to generate a horrific conflict. 

Given the fact that most books on the “second” Cold War examine the conflict from an international perspective, this book shows how a “local” dispute has blossomed into a “globalizing” conflict.

I like this book because Cohen writes about what happened and what could have happened―if Washington had chosen alternative foreign policies in its relations with the former Soviet Union and Russia. As I argued in Surviving the Millennium, this kind of approach is not “counter-factual” because it explores realistic policy alternatives made at the time that represent the paths not taken.

But sometimes, those alternative paths are actually implemented later in new circumstances, so they are part of the historical record and not “counter” the facts. I believe Cohen is right: The US lost a number of opportunities that could have brought Washington and Moscow into a more positive relationship that would have reduced tensions during the Cold War―and now in preventing the present “second” Cold War.

Gilbert Achcar has written one of the most complete recent studies from a global geostrategic and political-economic perspective. It explains the genesis of the “Second” Cold War between the US, Russia, and China, which stemmed in large part from the NATO air war “over” Kosovo with Serbia in 1999, which alienated both Moscow and Beijing.

Much as I have likewise warned in my later books, a major power war could be provoked by the Ukraine-Russia war since 2022 or by perceived Chinese threats to unify with Taiwan, among other conflicts―if diplomacy cannot achieve peace.

As a student of international order, I enjoy reading history from a very long-term perspective. This book – which won the Pulitzer Prize in 1998 – offers just that by providing an overview of the origins of society and relations of power, answering big questions about why there are socio-economic differences between regions of the world, the impact of geography and nature on technological development, and the implications of human footprint on the planet.

While this book is a bit of an outlier in this list when it comes to US-China relations, it helps us think in terms of how US hegemony, like the overtake of Europe over Asia, has mostly been an accident in history—and a temporary one, as China’s rise shows.

Better than superficial realist accounts, Lenin’s pamphlet on imperialism represents the finest analysis for explaining inter-state rivalries between great powers. In this book–which deeply informed my very first monograph, American Grand Strategy from Obama to Trump: Imperialism After Bush and China’s Hegemonic Challenge (Cham: Palgrave, 2021)–he traces the origins of the start of WWI back to (profit-driven) capitalism and the inherent need for governments, intertwined with major industrial and financial combines, to open up new economic opportunities using all the tools that states have, including negotiating trade deals, territorial conquest, and war.

This pamphlet is nowadays essential for understanding why the US and China are in a strategic competition, especially when looking at how the respective governments, in cooperation with their industrial champions in the Internet sector are vying for influence.

This is a must-read for all those interested in understanding US-China relations. It offers a comprehensive and objective account of the relationship from 1972–a crucial year due to the rapprochement–until after the end of the Cold War.

The author does an excellent job of capturing the main events and developing a rich narrative while maintaining an agile and accessible writing style. Although this book has been published decades ago, its key word–“fragile”–continues to capture well a relationship which has been characterised by a long series of highs and lows.

Kissinger is the ultimate political realist, and that’s why I find World Order so fascinating.

It’s always eye-opening to read someone who strips away illusions and shows the bedrock of power as it really is. For me, it was fun—and sobering—to see how he frames the world not as an ideal system but as a fragile balance of fear and bargains.

What I took away most was the reminder that “world order” is a phrase we use to comfort ourselves. In reality, there is no such thing, only shifting arrangements that hold until they don’t. That honesty made me think harder about how nations truly operate. While I don’t subscribe to this way of thinking, it’s always fun to explore.

Too often, Russia is seen through Euro-Atlantic eyes and in European terms. But the Russian leadership has long spoken of a shift in global power, the emergence of a “post-West” world—and of the 21st Century being a “Pacific Century.” China has long been at the heart of this view, and an important priority in Russian foreign policy—and this book by a prominent Russian expert traces a Russian view of the emergent Sino-Russian rapprochement. Not everyone will agree with his analysis, but I like thinking about things from different angles, and the intellectual challenge he poses becomes ever more important as sanctions take hold of the Russian economy and as the Sino-Russian partnership becomes one of the central questions of international affairs today.

Western commentators still try to analyze East Asian politics without reference to Russia as if countries ignore bordering great powers. For this obvious reason, Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and Russian leaders pay careful attention to each other because they share crucial borders. There are hardly any books on Russia’s pivotal role in Asia and most authors who try read none of the relevant languages. Rosemary Quested packed a lot into her concise book highlighting Russia’s role in the evolution of the Asian balance of power.